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Abstract
The introduction of habit formation in preferences means that the indi-
viduals derive utility from the comparison of the current level of own con-
sumption with that in the previous period. Therefore, when individuals
choose their current consumption, they are simultaneously setting a stan-
dard of living that will be used to evaluate the utility accruing from the
level of future consumption. This paper analyzes how the introduction of
habits modies the optimal tax evasion decision. I consider a two period
model where the taxpayer has to decide the amount of income he wants
to report to the tax authorities and the amount he wants to save. When
individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they
face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding ne.
I show that, under decreasing absolute risk aversion the introduction of
habit formation reduces the amount of evaded income.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the existence of consumption habits
modies the optimal taxpayer decision. Tax evasion models have traditionally
assumed that taxpayers obtain utility exclusively from the level of their own
current consumption. However, in the presence of habits, the utility derived from
a given level of present consumption will depend on a reference level, which can
be interpreted as a standard of living.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) considered a simple model to solve the
individual tax evasion problem. This approach (complemented later by Yithzaki,
1974) is at odds with empirical evidence. Taking approximated values for the
inspection probability, ne and tax rate, and considering a level of risk aversion
similar to the risk aversion exhibited in other situations, the model predicts that
people should evade more income than the real data shows.1 This paper tries to
solve the previous discrepancy endowing the basic model with new elements aimed
at better describing the taxpayer behavior. To this end I modify the basic model
of tax evasion assuming that the utility of a taxpayer depends on the di¤erence
between his current consumption and that in the previous period. Therefore,
when taxpayers decide their current consumption, they are simultaneously setting
a reference with respect future consumption is compared to.
Several papers in macroeconomics and nance have introduced habit forma-
tion in the agents utility function in order to reconcile some empirical facts with
the more traditional formulations that assumed time-separable preferences. Some
authors that have followed this line of research are for example Abel (1990, 1999)
who provided a possible explanation of the equity premium puzzle; Ljungqvist
and Uhlig (2000) who studied the e¤ects of scal policy under habit formation
and Carroll et al. (1997,2000) and Shieh et al. (2000), who carried out an analysis
of the e¤ects of habit formation on economic growth. The introduction of this
habit formation process has qualitative consequences for the maximization prob-
lem faced by consumers since, when they choose their current consumption, they
also decide a standard of living that will be compared with the level of future con-
sumption. There exists a large number of empirical studies that provides evidence
that individuals past decisions a¤ect the satisfaction derived from their current
decisions. For instance, De la Croix and Urbain, (1998) found that the habit-
formation process seemed particulary signicant the USA data. Carrasco et al.,
(2005) using data from the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey, ob-
tained that there is a signicant evidence of habit formation for food consumption
1It should be mentioned the di¢ culty of measuring the tax evasion magnitude. Therefore,
some bias could be possible in estimating the discrepancy between the real data and the one
predicted by the Allingham-Sandmos model.
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and services. Finally, Fuhrer and Klein (2006), presented an empirical evidence
suggesting that habit formation characterizes consumption behavior among most
of the G-7 countriess.2 These results support the view that the introduction of
habit formation in consumption can help to improve the predictions made under
time separable preferences in di¤erent elds.
In order to perform the anaIysis, I consider a model where individuals live for
two periods. Young individuals have an exogenous income and they only must
decide the amount they want to save. In the second period, taxpayers receive the
capital income accruing from their saving, which is subjected to a proportional
tax rate. A taxpayer could reduce his burden tax by declaring an amount of
capital income less that the actual one. There is uncertainty in the second period
since, if an agent is inspected by the tax authorities, his initial capital income will
be reduced by the ne that he has to pay. Moreover, the second period utility is
the outcome from the comparison between second period consumption and the
previous one. In this context, I will investigate the e¤ects both on savings and
on declared income (and, as a by-product, on consumption) of a variation in the
intensity of habits formation.
I nd that, if the intensity of habit formation on consumption increases, the
amount of declared income becomes larger when the individualsutility exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion and the relative risk aversion is large enough.
In this model is also interesting to analyze what happens with the amount of
concealed income, as the second period income is now endogenous. I obtain that
the amount of evaded income decreases if the relative risk aversion is less than
one and the absolute risk aversion is decreasing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the individual decision
problem. In Section 3 I analyze the e¤ects both on the consumption path and
on the amount of declared income of a change in habits on consumption. Finally,
Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2. The taxpayersproblem
Let us consider a large economy populated by a continuum of identical individuals.
The mass of individuals is normalized to one. These individuals live for two
periods and, when they are young (period 1), receive an exogenous income y;
which is the same for all individuals. In this period, taxpayers have to decide the
amount S of income that they want to save:
In their second period of life, individuals only receive the capital income
accruing from their saving. The gross rate of return on saving is constant and
equal to R: The capital income is subjected to a proportional tax rate  2 (0; 1):
Each individual declares an amount of capital income equal to x and, therefore,
2See also, Alessie, R.and F.Teppa (2010), Guariglia A. and M. Rossi (2002) and Hyde and
Sherif (2005).
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the amount x denotes the taxes that are voluntarily paid. Each agent will be
audited by the tax authorities with probability p. The inspection allows the tax
authorities to nd out the true income of an audited individual. Note that, even
if the income of an individual were known by the tax authorities, no penalties
could be imposed without an inspection certifying the existence of tax fraud.
Individuals have to pay a ne f() on unreported income if they are caught
evading. I will consider two alternative assumptions. The rst one consists of
imposing a penalty proportional to undeclared income and independent of the
tax rate. In this case, we have f() =  as in Allingham and Sandmo (1972). For
every unreported unit of income the taxpayer must pay a constant proportion .
This specication also requires that  >  since, otherwise, tax evasion would
not be punished. The second specication is based on imposing the penalty on
evaded taxes as in Yitzhaki (1974). In this case we have that f() =  with
 > 1; where the inequality is necessary to guarantee that a tax evader pays a
penalty greater than the taxes paid by a honest taxpayer. Threfore, the previous
assumptions mean that f() > :
Consumption in the second period of life takes place after taxes on declared
capital income have been paid and potential inspection occurs. Notice that
consumption in the second period is a random variable that takes the value
RS   x  f()(RS   x) with probability p and the value RS   x with
probability 1  p.
The temporal sequence of events in each period is summarized in the following
table:
First period
Individuals receive their
exogenous income.
Saving takes place
First period consumption
takes place.
.
Second period
Return on saving is received.
Individuals declare their capital
income and pay de corresponding taxes.
Tax inspection occurs with probability p and
the corresponding ne is paid.
Second period consumption
takes place.
The preferences of an individual are dened by a time-additive Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function
u(C1) + E

u
 eC2
where C1 is the rst period consumption of an individual, eC2 is the value of
random consumption in the second period. The random variable eC2 takes two
values,
bCN2 = RS   x  C1; (2.1)
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and
bCY2 = RS   x  f()(RS   x)  C1; (2.2)
which correspond to the value of the habit adjusted second period consumption if
the taxpayer is inspected and if he is not, respectively. The parameter  2 (0; 1)
measures the importance of the standard set by own past consumption and the
parameter  > 0 is the discount factor applying on future utility. The utility
function u is twice continuously di¤erentiable with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0; and satises
the Inada conditions lim
C!0
u0(C) =1 and lim
C!1
u0(C) = 0 in order to guarantee
interior solutions for consumption.
I assume that rst period consumption imposes a minimum level for future
consumption so that the utility derived by individuals from their second period
consumption will depend on the di¤erence between second period consumption
and rst period consumption. Note that I use the additivefunctional form to
introduce habits on consumption in this framework. 3
Therefore, a taxpayer chooses the amount of saving S and the declared income
x in order to solve the following program:
Max
n
u(C1) + (1  p)u
 bCN2 + pu bCY2 o ;
subject to
C1 = y   S; (2.3)
(2:1) and (2:2). Substituting (2:3) into (2:1) and (2:2) the e¤ective second period
consumptions become:
bCN2 = RS   x   (y   S) ; (2.4)
and bCY2 = RS   x  f()(RS   x)   (y   S) : (2.5)
An interior solution to the previous maximization problem must satisfy the
following rst order conditions:
(1  p)u0
 bCN2  = p [f()   ]u0  bCY2  ; (2.6)
u0(C1) = (1  p) ( +R)u0
 bCN2 + p (R Rf() + )u0  bCY2  : (2.7)
According to equation (2:6), the taxpayer compares the marginal utility obtained
from an extra unit of consumption when the inspection does not occur with
3In the literature, two alternative forms have been used to introduce habits. The rst one is
the additiveone, according to habits play in fact the role of a minimum level of consumption.
The second functional form is the multiplicative one, where consumersutility depends on
their current level of consumption relative to a reference level determined by habits.
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the loss that takes place when the individual is caught and, thus, punished.
Observe from (2:6) that positive evasion (RS > x) occurs if and only if (1 p) >
p (f()  ) ; which is the usual condition found in the tax evasion literature.
Equation (2:7) tells us that the taxpayer equates the utility of an extra unit
of rst period consumption with the expected utility obtained from a marginal
increase in second period consumption. Finally, substituting equation (2:6) into
(2:7) in order to remove bCY2 , we obtain
u0(C1) = (1  p)u0
 bCN2  +R +  (R Rf() + )f()  

: (2.8)
We are now in the position of studying the e¤ects of changes in habits intensity
:
3. The e¤ects of changes in habits on consumption
In order to evaluate the e¤ect of the change in the intensity of habit formation
on consumption, rst observe from di¤erentiating (2:3), (2:4) and (2:5) that
dC1 =  dS; (3.1)
d bCN2 = RdS   dx  d (y   S) + dS; (3.2)
d bCY2 = RdS   dx Rf()dS + f()dx  d (y   S) + dS: (3.3)
Dene the index of absolute risk aversion (C) =  u00(C)
u0(C) > 0: Taking the rst
order conditions (2:6) and (2:8) ; and logarithmically di¤erentiating both sides of
these equations, we obtain

 bCN2  d bCN2 =  bCY2  d bCY2 ; (3.4)
(C1)dC1 = 
 bCN2  d bCN2   1 +R(1  )d: (3.5)
Finally, using the expressions (3:1), (3:2), and (3:3) to substitute into (3:4) and
(3:5), and dividing by d we obtain the following equations:h
(R + ) 
 bCN2   (R Rf() + )  bCY2 i dSd =h

 bCN2 + (f()  )  bCY2 i dxd   (y   S) h bCY2    bCN2 i
(3.6)h
 (C1)  (R + ) 
 bCN2 i dSd =
5
  
 bCN2  dxd   bCY2  (y   S)  1 +R (1  ) (3.7)
Observe that we have a system of two equations and two unknowns, dS
d
and
dx
d
. Solving this system, we will obtain the sign of the previous derivatives. It is
important to remark that our results will not depend on the assumptions made
about the structure of the ne that an individual must pay if he is inspected.
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 3.1. An increase in the taxpayers habits intensity  results in:
(a) a larger amount of saving.
(b) a larger amount of declared income if the absolute risk aversion index is
decreasing and the relative risk aversion is larger than +R
+R(1 ) :
(c) a smaller amount of evaded income if the absolute risk aversion index is
decreasing and relative risk aversion is larger than one.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3:1 shows that when habits are stronger, the amount of saving
becomes larger and the amount of declared income rises under the assumptions
of decreasing absolute risk aversion and large enough relative risk aversion. In
this context, taxpayers form habits so that they do not derive utility from the
absolute level of their consumption but from the comparison of the level of
current consumption with that in the previous period. The presence of this
process of habit formation implies that consumers dislike more to experience
changes along their consumption path. Note that when  rises, the taxpayers
utility decreases for the same values of saving and declared income as now past
consumption becomes more important and this increases the taxpayersdegree
of risk aversion. Then, there exist two mechanisms through which taxpayers can
react to an increase of the importance of habits. The rst one is through saving
since the consumer can outweigh the e¤ect of habit by increasing his saving. Note
that an increasing in the amount of saving reduces the rst period consumption
and then the e¤ect of habits diminishes. The second mechanism is through the
amount of declared income. When taxpayer decides to increase his amount of
declared income, two di¤erent e¤ects take place. On the one hand, if the taxpayer
voluntary declares more income, he also will pay more taxes and consequently CN2
will decreases. On the other hand, more declared income implies that the penalty
that the taxpayer has to pay if he is caught will be lower and, under the necessary
assumption that f() > ; CY2 increases. Therefore, under the assumption
of decreasing absolute risk aversion, when individuals become less wealthy the
absolute risk aversion rises and, thus, taxpayers tend to declare more in order
to reduce their risk exposure. My results show that saving increases because
taxpayers are more willing to substitute second period consumption for rst
period consumption and then, declared income rises because of the assumptions
of decreasing absolute risk aversion and large relative risk aversion.
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In the standard static models of tax evasion the income is exogenous, whereas
in the presented model the second period income is endogenous since it is
determined by the amount of optimal saving. Then, more declared income does
not imply less evaded income, since both saving and declared income increase.
Proposition 3:1 shows that the amount of evaded income decreases, which means
that the amount of declared income increases more than saving when habits
become more important.
The e¤ect of an increase in the habit intensity on the consumption prole is
ambiguous in general. Trivially, rst period consumption will decrease since the
amount of saving is larger, and no other e¤ects take place. This result was the
expected one, since a reduction in rst period consumption goes in the direction
to o¤setting the increase in the habit intensity. However, the e¤ect on contingent
second period consumption is ambiguous. This ambiguity is a consequence of the
increase in the amounts of both saving and declared income. On the one hand,
more saving implies more income and therefore more consumption. On the other
hand, more declared income results in a higher tax bill, which reduces second
period consumption. Finally, note that more declared income allows taxpayers
to diminish the ne that they have to pay in case to be inspected by the tax
authorities.
Nevertheless, I want to remark that the e¤ect of a rise in the habits intensity
on second period consumption is not ambiguous under the strong assumption
of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). In this case, both consumptions CN2
and CY2 will increase. Under the CARA assumption declared income increases
in the same amount that RS does. Thus, the amount of evaded income remains
constant. As R >  it follows that the second period consumption when taxpayer
is not inspected rises. Similarly, the second period consumption when inspection
takes place also increases. It is easy to see that CY2 = C
N
2   f()(RS  x) and as
I mentioned before, the amount of concealed income does not change, so that CY2
becomes larger. The intuition of this result lies on the fact that an increase on
habit intensity does not modify the amount of evaded income. When taxpayers
become poorer, their absolute risk aversion does not vary so that they want to
keep the same amount of investment in the risky asset. In this framework the
amount of evaded income plays the role of a risky asset and, thus, taxpayers
decide to evade the same amount as before.
Finally, as I have shown, my main results depend crucially on two main
assumptions: the absolute risk aversion index should be decreasing with respect
to income and the relative risk aversion index should be larger than one. Let me
examine the empirical relevance of these assumptions. Some decades ago, Pratt
(1964) and Arrow (1965) proposed the measures of absolute and relative risk
aversion and established the commonly accepted hypothesis that absolute risk
aversion is decreasing with respect to income. Although the empirical evidence
does not yield a conclusive result, it generally tends to support the non-increasing
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relative risk aversion hypothesis.4. Moreover, under the assumption of constant
relative risk aversion, some authors performed several estimates of the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion. In particular, the majority of these estimates vary along
a wide range of values, where the lowest value is equal to 1 and the highest is equal
to 55.5 Therefore, the assumption that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is
larger than one seems quite plausible.
4. Some Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have introduced a habit formation process on consumption in order
to analyze how important could be the role of habits in deterrening tax evasion.
The results of my analysis show that, when habits become stronger, taxpayers
reduce the amount of evaded income and increase their saving. This is so because
the introduction of habits makes taxpayers more risk averse and, in order to
o¤set this e¤ect they end up declaring a larger amount of income. Therefore,
the introduction of habit formation into the taxpayers problem provides a direct
explanation to the fact that the standard model of tax evasion predicts a level of
evasion larger than the empirically observed.
I also have shown that the e¤ect of an increase in the habit intensity on the
consumption prole is ambiguous. While rst period consumption decreases due
to the increase in the amount of saving, the e¤ect on contingent second period
consumption is ambiguous. This ambiguity is a consequence of the increase
in the amounts of both saving and declared income. On the one hand, more
saving implies more income during the second period of life and, therefore, higher
consumption. On the other hand, more declared income results in a higher tax
bill, which lowers the amount of second period consumption.
4See for instance, Weber (1975), Ogaki and Zhang (2001), Friend and Blume (1975), Morin
and Fernandez (1983), Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Kang and Kim (2006), Haim (1994) Wik et
al. (2004).
5See Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) for a more accurated review of the value estimates.
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A. Appendix
Proof of Poposition 3.1:
(a) Solving the system formed by equations (3:6) and (3:7), we obtain the
following explicit solutions for dS
d
and dx
d
:
dS
d
=
BF   CE
BD   EA; (A.1)
dx
d
=
FA  CD
BD   EA; (A.2)
where
A =
h

 bCN2  (R + )   bCY2  (R(1  f()) + )i ;
B =
h

 bCN2   +  bCY2  (f()  1)i ;
C =  (y   S)
h

 bCY2    bCN2 i ;
D =
h
 (C1)  (R + )
 bCN2 i ;
E =  
 bCN2  ;
F =  
 bCN2  (y   s)  1 +R(1  ) :
Simplifying and collecting terms, it is easy to see that BD   EA < 0 and
BF   CE < 0 :We thus obtain a positive relation between  and the amount of
saving.
(b) It is immediate to see that under DARA and an index of relative risk
aversion larger than +R
+R(1 ) ;it holds that FA   CD < 0: Hence, an increase in
 implies a larger amount of declared income since BD   EA < 0 holds.
(c) Finally, we dene the amount of evaded income e as the di¤erence between
the true income and the declared income, that is, e = RS   x: Therefore, the
e¤ect of a rise in the parameter  on the amount of evaded income is
de
d
= R
dS
d
  dx
d
: (A.3)
Substituting (A:1) and (A:2) in (A:3) and collecting terms, we obtain
de
d
=
1
BD   EA
h

 bCY2    bCN2 i [(C1)(y   S)  1] :
Since it has been proved that BF   CE < 0 ; the sign of de
d
depends only on the
sign of the numerator. Under DARA it holds that
h

 bCY2    bCN2 i > 0.
Therefore, if the index of relative risk aversion is always larger than 1, we have
that de
d
< 0:
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